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In July of 1986, with a good deal of fanfare, Attorney General
Meese released the Report of his Commission on Pornography.' That
one leading magazine carried a "titillating" portrait of Mr. Meese on its
cover 2 parodying the Report prior to its release suggested that the media
was less than open-minded about its conclusions. In any event, few who
waded through the Report's nearly 2000 pages came away with any en3
thusiasm for its approach to obscenity.
In struggling with the task of separating proscribable obscenity from
protected speech, the Supreme Court has for more than thirty years inquired whether the material has an undesirable impact on its audience
and whether it has social value. Conceding that this approach has been
widely condemned, 4 the Attorney General's Commission nonetheless ratified it, attempted to provide empirical support for it, and ultimately suggested that it should be extended.
Though obscured by this commitment to the status quo, there lurks
within the Report an idea that offers a way out of the morass created by
* Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
1. ArToRNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT (1986) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
2. THE NEW REPUmLIC, July 14 & 21, 1986.

3. Reaction in the press was generally unfavorable. See,eg., Upton, No, the EvidenceAgainst
Porn isShoddy, L.A. Times, July 18, 1986, pt. II, at 5, col. 3; Chapman, Defining the Rea Issues on

Pornography, Chicago Tn'b., July 16, 1986, § 1, at 12, col 1; Yardley, The Porn Commission'sHidden Agenda, Wash. Post, July 14, 1986, at C2, col. 1; The Story ofX, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1986, § 4,
at 28, col. I (editorial); The Porno Proposal, Wash. Post, July 1I,1986, at A16, col. 1 (editorial);
Raspberry, Porno-Lover ; Dream, Wash. Post, July 11, 1986, at A17, col. 1; Not Sm4 Just Trash,

L.A. Times, July 10, 1986, pt. II, at 4, col. I (editorial).
4. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 261 (citing Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin
ofObscenity, 63 COLuM. L. REv. 391 (1963); Kalven, The Metaphystcs of the Law of Obscenity, 1960
Sup. Cr. Rv. 1; and Richards, FreeSpeech and ObscenityLaw: Toward a Moral Theory ofthe First

Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1974)).
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the Supreme Court's obscenity cases. In an aside that bears little relationship to the traditional approach endorsed therein, the Report discusses the illicit conduct-prostitution or child abuse-that is essential
to the production of most "hard core" pornography. An approach to
obscenity that focuses on this illicit conduct, rather than on the impact of
obscene material on its audience or the difficult question of social value,
can provide both doctrinal clarity and broader protection of the free expression of ideas.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF OBsCENITY LAW
The constitutional law of obscenity begins with Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,5 a case that had nothing to do with obscenity. In Chaplinsky, the Court sustained the conviction of a person who had precipitated
a sidewalk scuffle by calling a policeman a "God-damn racketeer" and a
"damned fascist." The Court held that such "fighting words" were
within the "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem."' 6
In dicta, the Court identified other such words--"the lewd and obscene, the profane, [and] the libelous. ' 7 They, like fighting words, "by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace."'8 The Court placed such words beyond the protection of the
first amendment because they "are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." 9
Like the "fighting words" that were actually at issue in Chaplinsky,
the other kinds of words to which the Court referred naturally tended to
injure or offend. "Libelous" speech falls into this category, as does the
"profane." 10 "Lewd and obscene" speech is also often designed to offend. Although only a shade of difference separates these terms, the
word "lewd" is often used when a speaker or actor confronts an unwill5. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
6. Id. at 571-72.
7. Id. at 572.
8. Id. In Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), Justice Holmes expressed a similar
view when he observed in his oft-quoted dictum that "[t]he most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even
protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect offorce." l at
52.
9. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
10. The Chaplinsky Court could not have intended to condemn all irreligious utterances irrespective of the setting; in placing profanity beyond the protection of the first amendment, the Court
surely had in mind only irreigious utterances directed at those holding religious beliefs.

Vol. 1987:123]

PORNOGRAPY

ing audience with indecent language or conduct.1 1 Thus, the "fighting
words" that were held to be proscribable in Chaplinsky, as well as the
"lewd and obscene" utterances to which the Court referred, were words
intimately bound with conduct because they are likely to cause an immediate retaliatory response given their inherent tendency to injure or offend the audience at which they are directed.
The Supreme Court comprehensively addressed the obscenity issue
for the first time in Roth v. UnitedStates.12 Justice Brennan, relying on
Chaplinsky'sidentification of the "lewd and obscene" as lying beyond the
protection of the first amendment, declared that "obscenity is not expression protected by the First Amendment.1 13 However, the Court failed to
recognize that Chaplinsky so categorized the "lewd and obscene" because "their very utterance inflict[ed] injury or tend[ed] to incite an immediate breach of the peace." 14 In relying on Chaplinsky, Justice
Brennan disregarded that premise and proceeded directly to Chaplinsky's
conclusion that such utterances are of slight social value. 15
Of course, the Roth Court did define obscenity in terms of its impact
on viewers or readers: "Obscene material is material which deals with
sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest." 1 6 However, the definition of "prurient" to which the Court referred-'"itching; longing; uneasy with desire or longing; of persons, having itching, morbid or
lascivious longings; of desire, curiosity or propensity, lewd" 1 7-has little
to do with the "injury" or "immediate breach of the peace" to which
Chaplinsky referred. Indeed, obscenity has an audience precisely because
it appeals to the prurient interest. Unlike the fighting words and the
other utterances discussed by the Court in Chaplinsky, obscenity is not
directed at an unwilling audience that is likely to retaliate against the
speaker. Thus, unlike Chaplinsky, Roth failed to identify a nexus bell.

See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986). The Court in Fraser

made repeated reference to the "lewd" speech given by a high school student in front of a captive
student audience. Id at 3165, 3166.
12. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Prior to Roth, the Court had directly confronted the issue of obscenity
regulation in Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 381, 383-84 (1957), where it held unconstitutional a
Michigan statute that made it a misdemeanor to sell books containing language "tending to the
corruption of the morals of youth." In Butler, the Court opined that the state had "bumned] the
house to roast the pig" by prohibiting the dissemination to adults of books that might fall into the
hands of youths. Id at 383.
13. Roth, 354 U.S. at 492.

14. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
15. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.

16. Id. at 487.
17. Id at 487 n.20 (quoting WBSTER'S NEW INTE1NAnoNAL DicrioNARY 1996 (2d ed.
1948)).
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tween obscene speech and some resultant disruptive conduct.13
The Court refined the Roth formulation over the next ten years.1 9
One issue left undecided in Roth was whether material that appeals to
the prurient interest necessarily is without redeeming social value or
whether, instead, the lack of redeeming social value has to be independently established. This issue was resolved in Memoirs v. Massachusett, 20 which made clear that the prosecution must establish that "(a) the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient
interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards; and (c) the material is utterly with21
out redeeming social value."1
The Memoirs formulation of the Roth test made it exceedingly difficult to prosecute obscenity cases.22 The defense was almost always able
to call an expert witness who would perceive some social value in the
challenged material. Perhaps prompted by the flood of X-rated movies,
peep shows, and the like that followed Memoirs, and certainly spurred by
a change in its composition, the Court decided five separate obscenity

cases on a single day in 1973 in a effort to restate Roth. The basic reformulation of the standard was set forth by Chief Justice Burger in Miller
v. California:23
18. Of course, it can be argued that obscenity need not be linked to harm to allowits regulation.
Cf Schauer, Speech and "Speech'-Obscenityand "Obscenity'". An Exercise in the Interpretationof
ConstitutlonalLanguage,67 GEo. L.I. 899, 920-22 (1979) (obscenity having purely emotive appeal is
outside first amendment protection).
19. One of the most notable opinions of that period is Justice Stewart's concurrence in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), where he acknowledged the difficulty of providing a definition of
obscenity, but observed that "I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is
not that." IML at 197 (Stewart, I., concurring). This confession of the need to judge obscenity in
highly subjective terms seems much closer to the Chaplinsky dictum than the elaboration of the test
in Roth. "Fighting words" necessarily are those which a speaker should know are likely to prompt
swift retaliation; they are uttered at the speaker's risk because most people will react in a predictable
fashion to them. Justice Stewart was perhaps saying much the same thing about obscenity in
Jacobeis: the obscene is that which most people, at a given point in a society's cultural and social
development, abhor.
20. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
21. Id. at 418 (emphasis added).
22. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969), in which the Court held that the first amendment prohibits making mere private possession of obscene materials a crime, seemed to provide a
further obstacle to the prosecution of obscenity cases. However, United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 375-77 (1971), in which the Court upheld the right of customs agents to
seize obscene materials notwithstanding the claim that they were to be used exclusively for private
purposes, sharply limited Stanley. As Justice Black put it in his dissent in that case, "perhaps in the
future [Stanleyl will be recognized as good law only when a man writes salacious books in his attic,
prints them in his basement, and reads them in his living room." IR at 382 (Black, J., dissenting).
23. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). For a discussion of the other four decisions, see infra notes 32-34 and
accompanying text.
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The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the
average person, applying contemporary community standards" would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.2 4
The most significant change effected by Miller was the Court's repudiation of the Memoirs requirement that the work must be "utterly without redeeming social value." Instead of forcing the prosecution in
obscenity cases to prove such a negative, Miller held that it would suffice
to show that the material was without "serious value."
At least as significant as the Miller reformulation of the obscenity
test was the dissenting opinion by Justice Brennan (joined by Justices
Stewart and Marshall) in the companion case of ParisAdult TheatreI v.
Slaton.2 Repudiating Roth and all of its progeny, Justice Brennan observed that "[n]o other aspect of the First Amendment has, in recent
years, demanded so substantial a commitment of our time, generated
such disharmony of views, and remained so resistant to the formulation
of stable and manageable standards. 26 This experience led Justice Brennan to the conviction "that the approach initiated 16 years ago in Roth
... cannot bring stability to this area of the law without jeopardizing
fundamental First Amendment values." 27 Accordingly, he concluded
that the interest advanced by the state in support of its general obscenity
statute "cannot justify the substantial damage to constitutional rights
and to this Nation's judicial machinery that inevitably results from state
efforts to bar the distribution even of unprotected material to consenting
adults." 28
The Miller majority conceded that "the absence, since Roth, of a
single majority view of this Court as to proper standards for testing obscenity has placed a strain on both state and federal courts."2 9 Moreover, the majority had no illusions that its reformulation of the Roth test
would solve the problems identified by Justice Brennan; it recognized
that its continued efforts to define obscene material "may not be an easy
road, free from difficulty."3 0 Nonetheless, the majority stated that it was
compelled to persevere with the burdens left by Roth:
24. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted).
25. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).

26. IH at 73 (Brennan, 1, dissenting).
27. IM (citation omitted).
28. I at 112-13.
29. Miller, 413 U.S. at 29.

30. I

DUKELIW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1987.123

But no amount of "fatigue" should lead us to adopt a convenient "institutional" rationale-an absolutist, "anything goes" view of the First
Amendment-because it will lighten our burdens .... "Our duty admits of no 'substitute for facing up to the tough individual problems
of
constitutional judgment involved in every obscenity case.' ,131
While thus acknowledging the difficulty of the task before it, the
Court proclaimed in companion opinions that it would apply the Miller
test not ouly to photographic materials but also to books,32 that the federal government could prevent the importation of materials found obscene under Miller,3 3 and that it could bar the shipment of such materials
34
in interstate commerce.
Perhaps the most important post-Miller obscenity decision is New
York v. Ferber,35 which upheld a New York statute prohibiting the use of
children in specifically defined "sexual performances," as well as the
transmission, sale, exhibition, or advertisement of materials depicting
such performances. The Court articulated several justifications for a
child-pornography exception to Miller: (1) the special state interest in
protecting minors,3 6 (2) the intrinsic relationship between the production
and distribution of child pornography and the abuse of the children
themselves,37 (3) the fact that production of child pornography-the actual use of children for sexual performances-is "an activity illegal
throughout the Nation, ' 38 and (4) the "exceedingly modest, if not de
minimis" social value of using children to enhance the presentation of
literary, scientific, or educational work.3 9 The Court concluded that
New York's statute bore "so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of
children" that any first amendment protection the materials might have
was outweighed by the state interest advanced by the regulation54
Although limited to the special problems associated with the production of child pornography, Ferber marks a potentially dramatic departure from the Roth-Miller approach to obscenity regulation. The
Court in Ferber was not concerned with the impact of the challenged
materials on their audience. Moreover, the Court did not find it neces31. Id. at 29-30 (footnote and citations omitted; quoting Iacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188
(1964)).
32. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-22 (1973).
33. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128-30 (1973).

34. United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 143-45 (1973). Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 69-70 (1973), upheld a Georgia statute that permitted injunctions against the exhibition of
obscene films.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

458 U.S. 747 (1982).
Id. at 756-58.
Id. at 759-61.
d at 761-62.
Id at 762-63.
Id at 764.
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sary to decide whether the materials had any redeeming social value. Instead, the Court focused on the state's interest in regulating conduct
rather than the effect on the audience as in Chaplinsky and concluded
that this interest per se outweighed any slight social value of the speech.
Thus stood the state of obscenity law at the time the Report was
written- the Roth-Miller inquiry into the "prurient interest" and "social
value" of most material, coupled with Ferber's special approach for the
problems of child pornography. Other than in the case of child pornography, the courts are still trying, as they have since Roth, to define obscenity by inquiring whether the material appeals to the "prurient
interest" and whether it has "social value." There could hardly be a less
edifying or more treacherous task for a court.41 Justice Brennan was
surely correct in ParisAdult Theatre I when he described Roth and its
progeny as giving rise to issues that are uniquely resistant "to the formulation of stable and manageable standards."' 4
Beyond the difficulty of applying Roth-Miller, the Supreme Court's
approach to obscenity is vulnerable to a more basic criticism. Having
departed from the speech-conduct rationale of Chaplinsky, the RothMiller approach ultimately is based on the assumption that the state has
the power to regulate ideas. 43 The proscription of expression that appeals to the prurient interest is based on the premise that it is unwise,
unsafe, or undesirable to induce by a form of public communication the
"itching," "longing" or "uneas[y] desire" associated with prurience.
Moreover, the "serious value" test implies state power to decide which
ideas deserve constitutional protection and which do not. The Court's
obscenity decisions, therefore, threaten much more than the dissemination of sexually explicit materials designed to titillate their audience.
Most scholarly commentators have roundly condemned the RothMiller approach to obscenity." More importantly, there seems to be an
41. As Justice Black lamented:

Mhis Court must sit as a Board of Supreme Censors, sifting through books and magazines
and watching movies because some official fears they deal too explicitly with sex. I can
imagine no more distasteful, useless, and time-consuming task for the members of this
Court than perusing this material to determine whether it has "redeeming social value."
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 380 (Black, J., dissenting).
42. ParisAdult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 73 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. See Perry, Freedom ofExpression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 Nw. U.L. REv.
1137, 1181-82 (1984) (state has arguable interest in maintaining orthodoxy with respect to certain
ideas and values regarding human sexuality).

44. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Some commentators have attempted to limit the
threat to free speech posed by the Court's obscenity decisions by categorizing pornography as "lowvalue" speech. According to these commentators, such speech can be distinguished from "highvalue" speech, that is, speech dealing broadly with effective popular control of public affairs. See,
ag, Sunstem, Pornographyand the FirstAmendment, 1986 DuicE LJ.589, 602-04. It is beyond the
scope of this comment to explore the validity of the low-value/high-value speech distinction. Suffice
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unwillingness, except in isolated circumstances, to prosecute obscenity
cases. Although the present relaxed attitude toward regulating obscene
materials doubtless has diverse origins, it seems likely that at least part of
the explanation for the widespread availability today of sexually explicit
materials in most communities may be the unwillingness of the people to
permit the state to act as a general censor of ideas. At the very least, it is
clear that producers and marketers of such materials have been able to
acquire powerful allies in the media and elsewhere by arguing that acquiescence in the state's authority to regulate obscenity today is a step on
the road toward the regulation of political or social thought tomorrow.
II. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT
A.

Deeper into the Roth-Miller Morass.

The Attorney General's Report does nothing to dispel the threat to
free expression of ideas posed by current obscenity law. To the contrary,
it suggests an even more ominous future.
The Report accepts the status quo despite its pitfalls. Although recognizing "that the bulk of scholarly commentary is of the opinion that
the Supreme Court's resolution of and basic approach to the First
Amendment issues is incorrect," 45 and although conceding that the testimony of various witnesses both "intelligently and forcefully" articulated
arguments against the Roth-Miller approach, 4 6 the Commission was ultimately "unpersuaded that the fundamental direction of [these decisions]
is misguided." 47 Indeed, the Commission stated that it was "confident
that [this approach] is correct," since "[t]he special power of the First
Amendment ought, in our opinion, to be reserved for the conveying of
arguments and information in a way that surpasses some admittedly low
48
threshold of cognitive appeal."1
To the members of the Commission, the first amendment does not
offer general protection for speech; instead, its "special power" is reserved for "arguments and information" that meet the Miller threshto say that the case Professor Sunstein cited to support it, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
269 (1964), itself recognizes that the first amendment was designed to ensure an unfettered exchange
of ideas not only for the "political... changes desired by the people," but also for "social changes."
See 8unstein, supra, at 603 n.85. Producers of pornographic materials argue that they are facilitating a healthy evolution of "social" standards by inviting a reexamination ofsexual mores and taboos.
See The PlaceofPornography,HAiwEn's, Nov. 1984, at 31, 32 (comments of Al Goldstein, publisher
of Screw Magazine) ("Pornography helps us free ourselves from the puritanical attitudes about sex
that have long dominated our society.").
45. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1,at 261.
46. Id. at 264.
47. Id

48. Id.
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old.49 Thus, the Report implicitly expresses confidence in the courts'
ability to separate good and bad speech and to distinguish between
worthwhile and worthless ideas. Certainly, this aspect of the Report offers no comfort to those who view Roth-Miller as a potential steppingstone to a more general censorship of ideas.50
The Report's approach to the question of the harm caused by pornography is even more troublesome. The Commission first speculated
about the relationship between antisocial conduct and material appealing
to the prurient interest within the meaning of Roth-Miller.51 Expanding
beyond a constitutional focus, the Report then addressed as "[a] central
part of [its] mission... the question whether pornography is harmful." 52
It "made a conscious decision 5 3 not to be constrained by the RothMiller test because it asserted that some forms of government regulation--such as zoning, as well as broadcast and liquor licensing-can be
applied to speech which is not constitutionally obscene 4 and because
other "techniques of social control"-such as public protest, picketing,
and boycotts-were believed to be unaffected by constitutional
guarantees.55
Having thus put constitutional constraints aside, the Commission
refused "to [be] burden[ed] ... with an unduly narrow conception of
harm."5 6 For the same reason, the Commission adopted a relatively relaxed standard of proof ofharm.5 7 Accordingly, the Commission considered not merely the harm that comes immediately from the material
itself-under Roth-Miller, the appeal to the prurient interest-but also
the harm that results from the way in which the material may change the
attitudes of the reader or viewer and enhance the likelihood of antisocial
behavior.58
49. Id
50. See &g., Dershowitz, PartnersAgainst Porn, HARPER's, May 1985, at 22.
51. The Commission concluded:
[T]he predominant use of such [obscene] material is as a masturbatory aid.... [O]nee the
predominant use, and the appeal to that predominant use, becomes apparent, what emerges

is that much of what this material involves is not so much portrayal ofsex, or discussion of
sex, but simply sex itself. As sex itself, the arguments for or against restriction are serious,
but they are arguments properly removed from the First Amendment questions that surround primarily materials whose overwhelming use is not as a short-term masturbatory
aid.
FINAL REPORT, supra note I, at 266.
52. I at 299.
53. I
54. IR
55. IaRat 300.
56. Id at 302.
57. I at 306-09.
58. I at 305-06.
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On this basis, the Commission ultimately concluded that "sexually
violent material"-material featuring actual or threatened violence
presented in a sexually explicit fashion 59 -leads to "an increase in aggressive behavior directed towards women."' 60 Because it "believe[d]
that an increase in [such] aggressive behavior... will in a population
increase the incidence of sexual violence," the Commission "unanimously and confidently" concluded that "substantial exposure to sexually violent materials... bears a causal relationship to antisocial acts of
sexual violence and, for some subgroups, possibly to unlawful acts of sex'61
ual violence."
Similar though more tenuous conclusions were reached regarding
nonviolent materials depicting degradation, domination, subordination,
or humiliation. 62 Materials that were neither violent nor degrading were
thought by some members of the Commission to be harmful because they
publicized sex; 63 such materials were also recognized as potentially
65
harmful to children. 64 "Mere nudity" was not thought to be harmful,
66
but in some circumstances was considered "undesirable."
Even though it does not purport to provide a basis for a constitutional delineation of obscenity, this aspect of the Report is troublesome
insofar as it lays a foundation for a social or political response to pornography. Roth-Miller identifies materials that can be proscribed by virtue
of their immediate appeal to the prurient interest of a viewer or reader;67
the Report proposes no change in this elusive standard. However, the
Report suggests that focusing on second-order effects of speech-attitude
and behavior modification-can help sustain either governmental regulation (such as zoning and licensing) or "informal" collective action (such
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Ia.at 323.
Ia.at 325-26.
Id. at 326.
Ia.at 329-35.
Id. at 340.
Ia.at 343.
IRL at 347.
Ia.at 348-49. At the conclusion of its discussion of the harm associated with pornography,

Ia at 349-51, the Commission discussed at length the need for further research:
There needs to be more research, for example, about the etlect of pornography on the
marriage relationship, about the nature of appetites for pornographic material and how
those appetites are developed, about the effects of depictions of particular sexual practices
on the sexual preferences of those who view them, and about the effects of exposure to
pornographic material on children. This list could be much longer, but the point is oly to
show that much more needs to be done.
IA at 349-50.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
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as picketing and boycotting). 68
Under conventional first amendment doctrine, the Supreme Court
reserves the closest scrutiny for those types of regulation that appear to
be aimed at the content of speech. 69 An approach that focuses on the
secondary effects of speech-effects on beliefs, attitudes, etc.--resembles
and may become indistinguishable from a constitutionally impermissible
inquiry into content. Before the Report, the view that secondary effects
70
justified regulation was for the most part held only by some feminists.
71
Now, this view appears to be gaining wider acceptance.
Obviously, this part of the Report provides no solace for those concerned with the shortcomings of Roth-Miller. To the contrary, the Commission's willingness to justify social constraints upon speech based on a
speculative linkage between speech, attitude modification, and antisocial
behavior raises a more troubling spectre for free expression than anything ever decided by the Court in Roth-Miller.
B. A Possible Escape
Although the Report endorses and indeed expands upon the RothMiller approach, it does contain evidence and observations that may provide the basis for an approach that leads out of the Roth-Miller morass.
Specifically, the Report made the following self-evident observations
about the conduct of those who participate in the making of pornographic films:
It seems abundantly clear from the facts before us that the bulk of
commercial pornographic modeling[,] that is, all performances which
include actual sexual intercourse, quite simply [are] a form of prostitution. So much was directly asserted by representatives of prostitutes'
organizations who testified before us, as well as representatives of law
enforcement and [was] effectively denied by no one. Every court
which has examined the questions from this standpoint has agreed,
reasoning that where persons are paid to have sex it is irrelevant that
the act is for display to others. As prostitution is conduct which the
state has a strong interest in regulating, the First Amendment does not
preclude
that regulation merely because it is labeled "speech" or is
filmed.72
68. To its credit, the Commission recognized the shortcomings of the type of studies upon
which it relied to document the "harm" caused by pornography. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at
312-20.

69. See, eg., Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959) (state
"struck at the very heart of constitutionally protected liberty" by banning film promoting adultery).
70. See, eg., MacKinnon, Not a MoralIssue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y Rnv. 321, 322-24 (1984).
71. See, eg., Sunstein, supra note 44, at 601-02.
72. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 889-90 (footnotes omitted). The Report also describes the
way in which "models" are selected and paid for their performances. Female performers are said
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The Report goes on to explore the way in which the state could use
the link between prostitution and the production of visual materials to
regulate pornography. 73 The Commission had little doubt that the application of antiprostitution laws "at least to producers and agents seem[s]
fully justified." 74 It therefore recommended that state and local prosecutors pursue producers of obscene material under pandering statutes.75 It
further suggested that local governments could impose sanctions on any
persons trafficking in products or materials "which they know or have
reason to know were manufactured or marketed through the use of persons engaging in prostitution."7 6 The Commission even suggested that
there was a sufficient federal interest in regulating interstate commerce to
allow the exclusion of products manufactured by means of illicit prostitution.77 Ultimately, however, the Commission felt that "the idea is sufficiently novel and could affect so much commerce not directly within the
purview of our charter that we merely offer it for consideration and debate."78 Accordingly, although the Commission made many other recommendations regarding the euforcement of obscenity laws within the
framework of Roth-Miller, it offered relatively few recommendations regarding regulation of obscene materials based on the illicit conduct that
goes into their making. 79
The Commission's decision to endorse Roth-Miller and to focus on
the nexus between the consumption of obscene materials and antisocial
behavior probably explains its failure to extend its inquiry into the connection between the production of obscene materials and prostitution.
Whatever the explanation, -theReport approached the brink of a conceptual breakthrough that could help courts come to grips with many of the
normally to earn between $350 to $500 per day, with better known "stars" earning as much as $2500
per day. a at 1368-76.
73. The Commission's observations regarding the criminality of the conduct involved in the
production of conventional pornographic films and videos also were made in the context of child
pornography:
The distinguishing characteristic of child pornography, as generally understood, is that

actual children are photographed while engaged in some form of sexual activity ....
Thus, the necessary focus ofan inquiry into child pornography must be on the process
by which children ... are induced to engage in sexual activity of one sort or another, end

[sic] the process by which children are photographed while engaging in that activity.
Id. at 405-06.
74. IH at 894.
75. IH at 523-25.
76. Ia at 894.

77. a at 894-95.
78. Id. at 895.
79. For example, the Commission recommended that Congress enact legislation making it an
unfair labor practice for an employer to hire individuals to participate in commercial sex performances. Id. at 478. As part of that recommendation, the Commission urged Congress "to probibit
the sale and distribution of any product made as a result of [such] unfair practices." IA at 481.
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contemporary moral and social concerns raised by obscenity and at the
same time significantly reduce the threat to free expression of ideas posed
by Roth-Miller.
IH. Tim SUGGESTED APPROACH

Ultimately, two basic rationales can be pursued to justify regulating
obscenity: preventing the harm inherent in the production of the material and preventing the harm flowing from the way the material affects its
audience. From Chaplinsky through Miller, the Supreme Court's focus
has been on the second rationale; the inquiry in all the oases has been
directed at the way in which the viewer is likely to react to the material.3 0
The Commission would broaden this inquiry by asking whether, as a
result of modification of attitudes or behavior, the affected viewer is
likely to go on to engage in antisocial or illicit conduct.
As Ferber makes clear, however, the state can pursue the first rationale by considering the conduct underlying the production of the challenged materials.3 1 As the Report notes,82 very few would question that
states can ban sex that is engaged in for pay. However, when such sex is
intended for expressive purposes-when regulable conduct is mixed inextricably with protected speech-courts must determine the extent to
which the conduct is immunized by its expressive impact.
Analysis of this question begins with United States v. O'Brien.83 In
upholding the conviction of a draft protestor who publicly burned his
draft card, the O'Brien Court applied the following four-part test: Is regulation of the conduct in question "within the constitutional power of the
Government"? Does it "further[] an important or substantial governmental interest"? Is that interest "unrelated to the suppression of free
expression"? And is "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms.., no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
80. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), requires a minor qualfication of the above
statement. In Ginzburg; the Court found that the "leer of the sensualist," id. at 468, which it detected in the advertising for the materials in question, evinced an intention on the part of the producer of the materials to appeal to the viewer's prurient interest. In this limited sense, the Gtnzburg
Court considered elements regarding the production or distribution of the obscene materials as they
bore upon a viewer's likely reaction to them.
81. In American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 106 S. Ct.
1172 (1986), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit pointedly suggested that
courts could uphold state statutes or local ordinances aimed at the illicit conduct portrayed in a film
or video: "The offense of coercion to engage in a pornographic performance ... has elements that
might be constitutional." Id at 332. The court read Ferberas "suggest[ing] that when a State has a
strong interest in forbidding the conduct that makes up a film... it may restrict or forbid dissemination of the film in order to reinforce the prohibition of the conduct." Id
82. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
83. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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interest"? 84
The fact that prostitution laws are of ancient origin and have roots
unrelated to the suppression of ideas would seem to demonstrate the validity of the state's interest in prohibiting sex for pay. Thus, affirmative
answers to the first three parts of the O'Brien test are easily given.
However, the fourth partof the O'Brien test-whether the "incidental restriction" on first amendment expression is "no greater than is essential to further the government's interest"--raises a more difficult
question. O'Brien suggests, however, that laws against prostitution, as
applied to expressive conduct, could meet this test:
When O'Brien deliberately rendered unavailable his registration certificate, he willfully frustrated this governmental interest [in the smooth
and efficient functioning of the Selective Service System]. For this
noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and for nothing else, he was
convicted.
The case at bar is therefore unlike one where the alleged governmental interest in regulating conduct arises in some measure because
the communication allegedly integral to the couduct is itself thought to
be harmful.85
The Court upheld the law prohibiting draft card burning because it
was "an appropriately narrow means of protecting [an important governmental] interest and condemns only the independent noncommunicative
impact of conduct within its reach."18 6 Statutes or ordinances broadly
prohibiting sex for pay in all circumstances-customary prostitution or
dramatic performances-would also "condemn[] only the independent
noncommunicative impact of conduct," leaving authors or actors free to
express themselves by a wide range of alternative means that would not
run afoul of the statute.87
84. Id. at 377.
85. Id. at 382.
86. Ird
87. While O'Brten, therefore, seems capable of sustaining the application of prostitution laws to
at least the production of photographic: materials, the Supreme Court's decision in Ferbersuggests
some hesitancy to rely on O'Brien when dealing with obscenity issues. In upholding a New York
statute proscribing not only the production, but also the distribution and sale of child pornography
depicting illicit acts, the Court at no point cited O.Brien.
The Court's decision last term in Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 3172 (1986), may also
show some uneasiness regarding application of the O'Brien test in the obscenity context. InArcara,
the New York Court of Appeals ruled that a New York public health law condemning the use of
buildings for prostitution and other activities could not be applied consistently with the fourth part
of the O.Brten test to close an "adult" book store where illicit sexual activities were shown to have
occurred. People ex reL Arcar v. Cloud Books, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 324, 336-37, 491 N.Y.S.2d 307,
316-17, 480 N.E.2d 1089, 1098-99 (1985). Although it reversed the New York court, the Supreme
Court did not rule that the fourth element of the O'Brien test was satisfied. Instead, the Court held
that the New York court had erred in even applying O'Brien, since "unlike the symbolic draft card
burning in O'Brien, the sexual activity carried on in this case manifests absolutely no element of
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Chaplinsky itself supports this reading of O'Brien. Chaplinsky
stands for the proposition that the state can proscribe speech that can
reasonably be expected to lead immediately to disruptive conduct.88
Chaplinsky holds that the state's interest in avoiding such conduct justifies a ban on the speech itself, despite the uncertainty whether "fighting
words" or similar terms hurled at an unwilling audience will provoke
violence. Photographed prostitution entails no such uncertainty. There
is direct nexus between the speech and the proscribable conduct.
Finally, in Ferbera majority of the Court had little difficulty finding
that the state's interest in protecting the welfare of children justified
prohibiting child pornography.8 9 A state has a similar interest in proscribing prostitution by adults. Surely that interest, even if less weighty
than the interest in protecting children from sexual abuse, is stronger
than the administrative interest in the smooth functioning of the Selective Service System that sustained the statute in O'Brien.
Assuming the state can proscribe the prostitution associated with
the production of obscene films, videos or photographs, the next question
is whether it can proscribe the distribution and purchase of such materials. Materials that depict unlawful conduct are not necessarily unlawful
to distribute or to view; there have been no challeges, for example, to
television coverage of airline hijackings. But distributors or consumers
of sexually explicit materials are doing more than merely viewing illegal
acts; they are providing the funds necessary to finance the prostitution
depicted on film.
Consumers of explicit photographic materials are buyers of sex, and
the distributors or retailers through whom they obtain these materials
are their procurers. 90 A voyeur who commissioned a man and a woman
to engage in a sexual performance for his personal enjoyment would violate the laws against prostitution. 9 1 The same result should obtain where
a roomful of paying customers views the performance or where the performance is photographed and reproduced for sale or rental.
protected expression." Arcara, 106 S.Ct. at 3176-77. Of course, the same could not be said with
respect to using prostitution laws to bar the production of plays, films, or videos.
88. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
89. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoes. v. Tourism Co., 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986), represeuts a further
concession to the power to regulate speech intertwined with illegal conduct. In Posada, the Court
held that a state's potential, but unexercised power to ban certain couduct (casino gambling) included the power to ban advertising of the conduct. Id. at 2979. Read together, Ferberand Posadas
reinforce the notion that when expression is directly and necessarily involved with regulable conduct, the expression may also be regulated.
90. See Schauer, supra note 18, at 922 (prototypical pornographic item is "a sexual surrogate").
91. See Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1976).
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In each case, the state interest that sustains the proscription of prostitution should extend to the ultimate consumers who generate the cash
necessary to finance the illicit transaction. Ferber clearly so holds with
respect to child pornography. If the state can advance its interest in protecting children from being used for the production of child pornography
by banning such materials, there would seem to be no reason why the
state's interest in prohibiting prostitution cannot similarly be advanced
by banning the sale and distribution of explicit materials.
An approach that focuses on the unlawfulness of the conduct that
underlies obscene expression would provide a foundation for regulating
all or most "hard core" pornography-movies, videos or still photographs of explicit sexual acts. 92 It would leave books, drawings, or other
materials that are not produced by means of illegal conduct free from
regulation. Although the Both-Miller test might be preserved to deal
with these less offensive materials, the adoption of a conduct-based approach should ultimately lead to an abandonment of that test and a recognition that materials that are not the fruit of illicit conduct constitute
93
speech deserving of full first amendment protection.
Undeniably, the approach suggested here does not answer every
question that can be raised in obscenity cases.9 4 Moreover, some will
argue that it merely trades one set of difficulties for another-those under
the Roth-Miller line of cases for those associated with O'Brien and other
speech-conduct cases. However, several factors support a conduct-based
approach to obscenity.
First, it is premised on the state's historic and undisputed power to
regulate conduct. Ultimately more faithful to the foundation for obscenity regulation set down in Chaplinsky, it is concerned with a direct nexus
between speech and conduct. The Roth-Miller line of cases obscured this
nexus and caused the Court to seek a justification for the regulation of
speech grounded in vague concerns over impure thoughts and necessarily
subjective notions that particular kinds of speech lack social value. The
approach suggested here refocuses the courts' inquiry on conduct-not
on the difficult question of predicting a listener's reaction to the "lewd
and obscene," which was the focus of Chaplinsky, but on the unambiguously illegal conduct underlying the production of the obscene materials
themselves.
92. See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 625 (evidence suggests that pornographic motion pictures

and photography harm participants).
93. Of course, room would remain for regulation to ensure that such materials are not "lewdly"

thrust upon an unwilling audience nor made available to children.
94. For example, how would the approach handle simulated sex?
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Second, the type of conduct-speech analysis suggested here moots
the intractable social science questions associated with attempts to determine whether the consumption of obscenity causes harm.9 5 Instead, it
addresses the historically recognized harm that flows from the selling
and buying of sex.
Third, this approach takes courts out of the business of assessing the
social value of ideas. It is irrelevant whether the prostitution is offered in
the form of a live sex act on 42nd Street in New York or as the consummation of young lovers' passion in Romeo and Juliet Just as in O'Brien,
no matter what the intent of the authors or actors, their expressive purposes cannot justify commission of the offense. But books, drawings, and
other works that are the result of the imagination could not be reached
through an approach to obscenity that turns upon the presence of prostitution. Acceptance of this approach would make it clear that the state
cannot interfere with the willing exchange and expression of ideas, no
matter how offensive those ideas may be to prosecutors or courts.
Fourth, an approach to the obscenity issue that recognizes both the
illegality of the underlying conduct and the complicity in that conduct by
those who pay for it should change the framework for public debate. No
longer would purveyors of "explicit" materials be able to march under a
banner combatting state censorship. Focusing on the illegal conduct that
they commission properly identifies them as procurers of sex for pay.
Moreover, consumers of obscene materials would no longer be able to see
themselves as persons participating in the "free exchange of ideas;" they
instead would have to recognize that they are the buyers of the sex that
prostitutes sell.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Attorney General's Report has, perhaps unwittingly, laid the
basis for a new approach to obscenity regulation. By discussing the prostitution involved in the production of obscene materials and emphasizing
the way in which it can be regulated, the Report suggests a workable
approach to obscenity regulation. The condemnation of actions that
have historically been recognized as criminal, rather than the prosecution
of impure thoughts or unworthy ideas, can extract obscenity law from
the morass that Roth-Miller has created and the Report otherwise
endorses.

95. For a discussion of the available social science data, see Sunstein, supra note 44, at 591-602.

